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Konstantin Megrelidze’s Theory of Consciousness
The fate of Konstantin Megrelidze’s thought is as tragic as it is para-
doxical – the thinker’s opus magnum was published decades after it was writ-
ten, because of political censorship, the author himself died in exile, and the 
second book, written in a Soviet lager, has been irrevocably lost. The thought 
itself is present in modern social sciences, but this is a presence of something 
fogotten. This presence of the forgotten gets Megrelidze’s name mentioned 
in the Handbook of Contemporary European Social Theory once (Delanty 2006, 
p.159)1; the third edition of his major work was republished in the Russian 
language in 20072; and there are some works published in Georgian, Rus-
sian and Western European languages about his thought3. But his work has 
not yet been translated into any other language, which would make it avail-
able to an international audience (it exists only in Russian and Georgian); 
the number of persons in Western academia familiar with his work is lim-
ited to the specialists of the history of Soviet epistemology; and the place he 
deserves in the development of social and philosophical thought has not yet 
been determined. 
But the paradox extends farther. Not only was Megrelidze’s Major 
Problems of the Sociology of Thought, written in 1936, published only in 1965; 
not only did it haveto undergo the process of self-censorship, which changed 
the initial title of the book from Social Phenomenology of Thought,which the 
in the 1930s was no longer acceptable, but the first edition of the book, pub-
lished after the “thaw” initiated by Khrushchev’s 1956 anti-Stalin speech, 
was itself heavily censored and adapted to the changed realities of the post-
Stalinist Soviet Union. References to Stalin were taken out, but, what is of 
more importance for the argument of the work, long discussions of, quota-
tions from, and reference to, the work of Nicholas Marr and his theories, were 
also deleted. Thus, the readers of Megrelidze’s work of the last half a cen-
tury have been familiar with it only in a truncated and abridged form, since 
the full edition of the book still awaits publication, lingering in the archives. 
This is a deplorable situation for many reasons. In the history of Soviet 
social sciences and humanities, Megrelidze provides an indispensable body 
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of work to understand the developments of philosophy, sociology, psycholo-
gy and linguistics in the 1920s and 1930s. He was situated on the crossroads 
of strategically important networks – being educated in the German tradi-
tions of phenomenology and Gestalt psychology, having attended lectures 
and seminars of Edmund Husserl, Wolfgang Köhler and MaxWertheimer in 
Freiburg and Berlin from 1924 to 1927, moving to Leningrad in the 30sto 
become a researcher at Nicholas Marr’s institute, interacting with Alexander 
Luria, developing his theory of consciosness and language in parallel with 
Lev Vygotsky, Valentin Voloshinov and Mikhail Bakhtin. The relative ne-
glect of his work deprives us of the possibility to analyze the developments 
of humanities in the first decades of the Soviet Union in all its fullness and 
complexity.
Megrelidze developed a theory of human consciousness, which was 
both part of the historical context of early Soviet epistemology and attempt-
ed to break out of its limitations. Megrelidze’s thought originated at the in-
tersection of different disciplines and disciplinary traditions: phenomenolo-
gy (in its Husserlian form), Gestalt psychology, Marrism (Megrelidze’s book 
was written during the time when the author was working in N. Marr’s in-
stitute). Another important current of thought, which had influence on Me-
grelidze’s conception, was the French sociological tradition, together with 
nascent structuralism. E. Durkheim, L. Levi-Bruhl and F. de Saussure are 
authors often referred to in the book. Megrelidze’s aim was to show – in con-
trast to the traditional empiricist approaches – the social nature of the human 
consciousness. The above-named authors were interesting for him, first of all, 
because they went beyond the empiricist tradition, which entailed reduction 
of the consciousness on sensory data and association mechanisms. But still, 
the word “sociology” in the title was chosen on second thought. The original 
idea for the title was Social Phenomenology of Thought, which was presumably 
suppressed by the author because of political reasons - it was the word “phe-
nomenology,” which, in the ideological atmosphere of the 1930s, had become 
too problematic to be used in the title of a book that wanted to present itself 
as standing firmly on the ground of orthodox Marxism. 
The original title gives us the possibility to reflect on the influence of 
Husserl’s phenomenology on Megrelidze’s thought. One could argue that 
what mattered for Megrelidze was Husserl’s main idea of the intentional 
character of consciousness. As it is often defined, consciousness for Husserl 
(1950) is always the consciousness “of something”.
Although for Husserl every conscious act is directed, this does not 
mean that there is always a real object towards which it is directed.4 Accord-
ing to Husserl, with each act of consciousness a noema is associated, in virtue 
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of which the act is directed toward its object, if there is any - when we think 
of a centaur, our act of thinking has a noema, but it has no object; therefore 
there exists no object of which we think. Because of its noema, however, even 
such an act is directed. To be directed is to have a noema.
The noema is an entity, a generalization of the notion of meaning (Sinn, 
Bedeutung). The noematic Sinn is that, in virtue of which consciousness re-
lates to the object. The noema of the act is not the object of the act. The no-
ema is an abstract entity and is not perceived through our senses. 
 This discovery of noema is fundamental because it makes two very 
popular philosophical positions, dominant in Megrelidze’s time, obsolete. The 
first position is that of Ernst Mach, which reduced reality to the complex of 
sensations. This position was called subjective idealism in Soviet philosophy 
and was the main target of the Leninst critique (Katvan 1978, 87-109). Phe-
nomenology shares the rejection of this position, since the latter does not 
allow objects to exist by interpreting them as a complex of subjective asso-
ciations. Phenomenology makes this position philosophically untenable by 
demonstrating, through the painstakingly detailed analyses, that conscious-
ness is directed at the object and not at the complex of associations.
On the other hand, phenomenology also makes impossible the philo-
sophically naïve Leninist theory of reflection, according to which, cognition 
is nothing else but the reflection of the object into consciousness, reflection 
being a general character of the matter (Ibid., 87-88). By demonstrating that 
consciousness is directed at the object through noemata – and interpreting 
the process of this directedness as constitution – phenomenology introduces 
a new dimension into the analysis of cognition, which is reducible neither 
to objects nor to consciousness, but which ensures the link between the two. 
Constitution itself is a way an object is intended in consciousness; an object 
is intended through a manifold of meanings (senses, noemata) that present 
the same object as having various properties – for example, presenting pos-
sible properties of the back side of an object in visual perception which does 
not show this back side at all. 
If we put Megrelidze’s work in this context, it will become obvious that 
he attempts to develop a similar position and connect it with theories of lan-
guage and society without referring explicitly to Husserl (who was himself 
considered a “subjective idealist” in the Soviet Union). 
In a philosophical gesture, which is reminiscent of Husserlian phe-
nomenology, Megrelidze opens his book with a criticism of the naturalistic 
theories of consciousness. This is a fundamental step, since it repeats the pro-
cedure of primary importance for the way thatphenomenology of conscious-
ness is introduced in the works of its founder. Specifically, in the first volume 
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of Husserl’s Logical Investigations and in the opening chapter of his Ideas I, 
naturalistic attitude is the one to be overcome in order to reach the phenom-
enological level of reflection;  since naturalism reduces the processes of mean-
ingful constitution to the natural processes of a physiological sort. 
“Ideational content of consciousness” is the concept by which Megerlid-
ze is taking into account this systematic fundamental phenomenological po-
sition without affiliating himself all too openly with Husserl. Ideational con-
tent of consciousness – or, as he also says, the capacity to freely reproduce 
representations – is an essential trait differentiating human consciousness 
from animal consciousness. Megrelidze then, sees human consciousness as 
the capacity to actualize its representations freely in relation to past and fu-
ture.  Consciousness is an imagination of not yet existing (the future) and al-
ready not existing (the past) phenomena.
This is where Megrelidze (2007, p.17) introduces his concept of con-
sciousness, which is rather broad: “The general formula of consciousness – 
away of orienting of the individual in the milieu”. This general determination 
should make us think of several issues. First of all, it expresses the conviction 
that human consciousness has its origin in the lower forms of the psyche, spe-
cifically in the animal psyche. But Megrelidze rejected the naturalistic inter-
pretation of this origin. The reason for this rejection was that the naturalistic 
approach reduces the orienting activity of the individual toits physiological 
and biological presuppositions. These presuppositions of consciousness are of 
course to be taken into account, but they leave out the fact of the existence of 
human society, which cannot be deduced from the individual behavior. This 
inability stems from the way the physiological approach considers each and 
every individual in his/her capacity to orient himself/herself in the milieu 
without referring to this individual’s relationship with other individuals. e. of 
the essential intersubjective character of human consciousness. Those com-
mitting the naturalistic fallacy see the distinction between the animal psyche 
and human consciousness as a difference in degree, not in nature and essence. 
But, according to Megrelidze, there is an essential difference between these 
two phenomena. This difference can only be taken into account when there 
is a clear understanding of the fact that human consciousness has human so-
ciety as its prime presupposition.The individual is understood here as a pro-
ducer, a producing being, to whom the object is not given as a finished entity, 
it is given to him as a task (following Hermann Cohen’s formula – “nich-
tgegeben, sondernaufgegeben” also used by Megrelidze, but in an entirely dif-
ferent sense). The consciousness of the individual is not mirroring the object 
existing outside him independently; the conscious representation of the ob-
ject shows this object as something to be produced, to be created; represen-
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tation gives us the object in view of the transformation it has to undergo as 
a result of our practical activity. 
Thus, the subject, according to Megrelidze, produces the content of 
consciousness, which does not correspond with the object of cognition. But it 
is not to be reduced and explained away by referral to the subject. Megrelidze 
was looking for a way to avoid both underestimating and substantializing the 
role of activity. It is not objective thought forms to which certain content of 
consciousness corresponds, but the content, which is proper to consciousness, 
and which is not reducible to the subject. This, once again, explains the con-
cept of ideational content of consciousness: it is the content proper to con-
sciousness, which only has the cognitive reference to the object because there 
is a relation between the subject and object of cognition. 
Since the content of consciousness of an individual is free and ideation-
al, he relates to other individuals as independent and distinct. The same object 
can be perceived by different individuals differently. Thus, the communica-
tion between different individuals becomes problematic. The states of other 
organisms, such as joy or pain,can be perceived without mediation, but the 
ideational content of consciousness of other individualsremains inaccessible 
to us without mediation. Another social tool is needed: language. Language 
is for Megrelidze an important condition of possibility for the ideational con-
tent of consciousness. Only through language is the existence of reproductive 
representations possible. On the grounds of this approach Megrelidze stresses 
the special character of the sign. Language for Megrelidze is not a mechani-
cal sign, through which the subject arbitrarily and externally coordinates the 
sound complex with an object. Language is the expression of the ideational 
content of consciousness. Megrelidze attempts to show that the genesis of 
this content is intimately linked with the genesis of human language. 
However, before turning to the question of language, there is another 
question to be considered: do animals have reproductive representations, on 
which the ideational content of consciousness is founded? The question was 
addressed by Megrelidze in the context of the discussion of Gestalt psychol-
ogy. There is a significant parallelism between the approaches of phenome-
nology and Gestalt psychology, of which Megrelidze is well aware. Both of 
them reject the reduction of meaningful phenomena on sensory data. What 
interests Megrelidze in this particular regard is the experimental basis of 
Gestalt psychology. He discusses in detail Wolfgang Köhler’s experiments, 
which had as their aim to show the intellectual behavior in apes. Can apes 
have reproductive representations? Megrelidze is skeptical of this possibil-
ity, indicating that apes can only make certain human-like actions because 
these acts are immanent moments of the task situation. These actions impose 
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themselves upon apes; there is a capacity of abstraction from the situation, 
which is lacking in primates.This is explained by Megrelidze when he refers 
to paradoxical but exact formulations suggested by Gestalt psychology: “The 
box tends into the situation” (Kurt Koffka’s expression when discussing the 
case of an ape using a box as an instrument to reach a certain goal in a hu-
man-like fashion). Megrelidze saw in this, and related formulas, the key for 
explaining the so-called intellectual behavior of apes. That is why we cannot 
speak of ideational content of consciousness in relation toapes. The capaci-
ties suggested by the representatives of Gestalt psychology such as Köhler 
can be explained from the objective relationships, not from the subjective ca-
pacities of the higher animals. Thus, according to Megrelidze, “reproductive 
representations” ascribed to animals are mechanical, unmediated, mirroring 
of the objects. These are sporadic behaviors, which then can be automatized 
and transformed into conditional reflexes. According to Megrelidze, this kind 
of behavior cannot be the origin of specifically human activity, since not ev-
ery kind of situation presents its own effective solution. As for the ideational 
content proper, it is not dependent upon the situation, but in most cases on 
the disposition of consciousness itself. This is why Megrelidze rejected the 
possibility of a general, organizing, Gestalt principle, which would organize 
both animal and human mirroring of the world. Megrelidze’s approach takes 
off from the criticism of Gestalt psychology and cannot be consideredwith-
out this criticism. 
However, Megrelidze does go farther than this, partially contradicting 
his own conclusion, but finding a more convincing ground to differentiate 
animal psyche from human consciousness. According to him, animals are able 
to produce acts of consciousness, but they are not able to retain these acts. 
This is an important point, since it points to the crux of Megrelidze’s theory 
of consciousness. In order for consciousness to perpetuate itself beyond spo-
radic acts, a social setting is needed and this is exactly what animals lack. The 
major argument of Megrelidze consists in showing that the determinants 
of human consciousness are to be found not in the natural but in the social 
world. He attempts to think the genesis of ideational content of conscious-
ness as a sociogenesis. This was conceived as an attempt to overcome the ex-
isting vulgar Marxism of the time, which operated within the framework of 
subject-object dichotomy. It is against this approach that Megrelidze intro-
duced intersubjectivity as the major topic of his theory of consciousness. Hu-
man consciousness, according to him, can only deal with objects if it thinks 
in relation with other subjects. As in Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations, which 
were published several years before Megrelidze’s monograph,5 the Georgian 
philosopher understands intersubjectivity as the condition of possibility for 
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the emergence of objectivity. As it is known, Husserl was according an in-
creasingly important role to intersubjectivity, by which he meant the interac-
tion of different subjects in the surrounding world, especially in our collective 
constitution of objects in nature or in culture. What could be taken in the 
beginning of his phenomenology, as a phenomenon pertaining to an indi-
vidual consciousness, appeared with time (especially in the 1920s and 1930s) 
to be the function of intersubjective community. Objectivity is constituted by 
intesubjective community. It is through the experience of the other that we 
gain access to the world of objects. This certainly leaves the question of the 
synchronicity between different subjects to be explained –if objectivity is de-
pendent upon the community of different subjects, how does this community 
come into existence and how is it possible that ideational contents of differ-
ent consciousnesses agree with each other?
This is where Megrelidze introduces the question of language and refers 
to the conception of Nicholas Marr. What is important for him is the link-
age between language and praxis. Meanings and senses kept in language are 
derived from the concrete practical activities of human beings; praxis explains 
semantics. By referring to the ethnological literature, Marr and Marrists, as 
well as Megrelidze, demonstrate how linguistic studies can show this rooted-
ness of semantics in functionality: e.g. some tribes refer to a mirror as the wa-
ter, and to a clock as the sun, thus giving to the unknown objects the names 
of those things, which had been fulfilling the same function in their practical 
activities (Meshchaninov 1929). Another example of this train of thought is 
found in Megrelidze’s discussion of the difference between color systems in 
different cultures. The absence of the color green in the worlds of Vedas and 
Avesta, as well as different perception of colors in the ancient Greek world 
is not attributed by him to some kind of physiological cause, but is explained 
as a fact derived from the concrete praxis of historical human beings (Me-
grelidze 2007, 197-198). 
Marr was not the first to notice this functional origin of semantics. 
Ludwig Noiré and Lazarus Geiger, German thinkers of the 19th century, 
both had written extensively on the subject – Marr took their theory and in-
tegrated it into his idiosyncratic “new linguistic doctrine”. Megrelidze knew 
about this origin and discussed it explicitly in one of his texts.6 This was the 
theory, which gave him the possibility of linking consciousness and prax-
is – a constant task facing the attempts at synthesis of phenomenology and 
Marxism throughout the 20th century (Desanti 1994). Through rooting the 
objectivity in intersubjective relations and linking intersubjectivity with lan-
guage, for which the point of reference became the existing social practic-
es of any given culture/society, Megrelidze seemed to have outlined a so-
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cial theory,which would provide a picture of social determinants of human 
thought. 
This opens the way for Megrelidze to establish the independent realm 
of cultural and historical phenomena. The criticism of naturalism was needed 
not only to free the human consciousness from its dependence upon physio-
logical causes, but to free the space for the consideration of a separate dimen-
sion as well,which is more important for understanding the content of human 
consciousness than the biological substratum it presupposes. The quotation of 
Giambatista Vico in the first paragraph of the first chapter of the book, where 
the Italian thinker draws a distinction between nature and history accord-
ing to the principle of their relationship with human productivity, proves to 
be essential for the understanding of Megrelidze’s theoretical project.7 Vico 
attempted to found the science of human affairs in criticizing the dominant 
Cartesian tradition;8 in many ways Megrelidze follows in his footsteps by at-
tempting to dissociate the theory of consciousness from the domination of 
natural sciences. This explains the turntowards the rich material he draws 
from anthropology, folklore, and sociology in his study. The primary notion 
is that together with the theory of language, the theory of consciousnessis 
needed to understand human society. The attempt to demonstrate the origi-
nal unity between consciousness, language, and social practice, remains the 
most important contribution of the Georgian philosopher to social theory. 
Notes:
1 See Delanty (2006): “A little-known work on the sociology of thinking 
by the Georgian philosopher  Constantine Megrelidze, who died at an 
early age”. 
2 Мегрелидзе, К. [Megrelidze, C.], 2007. Основные проблемы 
социологии мышления [Major Problems of the Sociology of Thought]. 
Москва [Moscow]. 
3 See Бочоришвили, А. [Bochorishvili, A.], 2007. “От редактора” [From 
the editor], in: Мегрелидзе, К. Основные проблемы социологии 
мышления [Megrelidze, C. Major Problems of the Sociology of 
Thought]. pp. 3-7. Москва [Moscow]; Джиоев, О. [Dzhioyev, O.], 1980. 
“Опережая время” [Ahead of time], in: Заря Востока 17 декабря; Zarya 
Vostoka 17 Dec. [Тбилиси] Tbilisi;  Friedrich, J. 1993. Der Gehalt der 
Sprachform: Paradigmen von Bachtin bis Vygotskij. Berlin: Akademie 
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Verlag; Friedrich, J. 2005. Les trace de N. Marr dans le livre de K. Me-
grelidze, in: Cahiers de l’ILSL N° 20, pp. 109-125; Мотрошилова, Н. 
[Motroshilova. N.], 2012. Отечественная философия 50-80-х годов 
XX века и западная мысль [Russian Philosophy in the 50–80s years of 
20th Century and Western Thought]. pp. 131-136. Москва [Moscow].
4 Here I am summarizing the well-known article of Dagfin Foellesdal 
(1969) “Husserl’s Notion of Noema”, in: Journal of Philosophy, 66: 
680-687.
5 This precedence does not necessarily imply that Megrelidze was famil-
iar with Husserlian theory of intersubjectivity. He left Fribourg in 1925 
when this problem was still not the center of Husserl’s attention. Car-
tesian Mediations was only published in French translation in 1931. It is 
hard to surmise whether Megrelidze was aware of the newest develop-
ment in phenomenology. It seems more likely that his turn from con-
sciousness to the social world was rather effected through the intermedi-
ation of Marxist problematic of society and Marrist problem of language. 
6 See Мегрелидзе, К. [Megrelidze, C]. 1935. “Н. Я. Марр и Философия 
Марксизма” [N. Marr and Marxist Philosophy], in: Проблемы истории 
докапиталистических обществ [Problems of the history of pre-capital-
ist societies] 3-4, 70-89; Мегрелидзе [Megrelidze]. 2007. Основные 
проблемы социологии мышления [Major Problems of the Sociology 
of Thought], p.127. Москва [Moscow].    
7 Megrelidze quotes Marx quoting Vico: “Die Menschengeschichte un-
terscheidet sich dadurch von der Naturgeschichte, dass wir eine gemacht 
und die andere nicht gemacht haben” (Мегрелидзе, 2007, 25). Interest-
ingly enough, this is the only quotation of Vico in G. Lukacs’ book His-
tory and Class Consciousness, which was the object of ideological attacks in 
the Soviet Union of the 20s and 30s. The leading role in this attack was 
played by А. Deborin (cf. his article “Г.Лукачиегокритикамарксизма”, 
in: Подзнаменеммарксизма, 6-7, 1924,49-69), whom Megrelidze knew, 
since Deborin was present at the defense of his dissertation in 1936 as a 
member of the committee. The major disagreement of Deborin and the 
official Marxism-Leninism with Lukacs’ interpretation of Marx was the 
question of difference between nature and society and whether dialec-
tics could be applied to both regions (as Soviet Marxism held) or only 
to social and historical phenomena (as Lukacs contended). In this de-
bate, Megrelidze seems to be siding with Lukacs; quoting Vico through 
Marx in the original German without giving a Russian translation in the 
book itself, which seems to be a way to defend himself from the accusa-
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tions of heresy. This is another, non-phenomenological, Marxist context 
for understanding Megrelidze’s thought. 
8 See Vico, G. 1968. The new science of Giambattista Vico. Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press; On Vico cf. Amoroso, L. 2006. Erläuternde 
Einführung in Vicos „Neue Wissenschaft“. Würzburg: Königshausen & 
Neumann. 
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